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Abstract. Auditing operations in multi-party data exchange, and over an arbi-
trary topology, is a common requirement yet still an open problem especially in 
the case where no trust on any participating party can be presumed. The chal-
lenges range from storage of the audit trail to tampering and collusion of partic-
ipating entities. In this paper, we propose a blockchain-based auditing scheme. 
It is designed based on public key infrastructure and Shamir secret sharing 
scheme. 
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1 Introduction 
Controlling how sensitive data is shared is an open problem with no complete solution 
in sight. Beyond the impact of the loss of data itself, it also brings a sharp negative 
impact on the public’s trust and discourage them to engage with electronic systems or 
share their data [1]. Auditing of workflow is thus a key element when handling data 
flows. Considering a simple supply chain scenario in Fig. 1, which involves a cus-
tomer (C), a sales company (S), a manufacturer (M), and a logistics organization (L). 
When C places an order with S, S receives the order and then sends the product re-
quirements to M. M produces the goods after the received requirements and asks L to 
deliver the product to C within the agreed upon timeframe. Then C receives the goods 
from L. Let’s assume C is not satisfied with the product due to a defect and needs to 
return it. The key issue is which entity is responsible for this error. L may be respon-
sible for the fault because of a failure in handling the package or M may have given a 
defective product to the delivery company. If no companies admit the error, and all 
parties produce their own internal records showing no fault, one can only assume 
some of them intentionally modified the existing records in their system to prevent 
truthful auditing. Having a robust audit system with immutable audit trail is vital to 
assure non-repudiation and assign accountability for malpractice [2]. 
                                                          
*  Vitor Jesus is the corresponding author. 
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Fig. 1.  An example scenario               Fig. 2. A representation of a data exchange workflow 
Blockchain is a decentralized distributed ledger that contains an ordered list of rec-
ords in a chain [3]. It is a promising innovation technique given its intrinsic distribu-
tion and immutability properties having found application in both financial and non-
financial areas [4] [5], such as government public management [5], healthcare indus-
try [6] [7], and privacy preserving in data sharing networks [8] [9]. Blockchain also 
enables a peer-to-peer transactions without intermediaries or trust relationship agree-
ment. 
In this paper, we propose a novel scheme to construct tamper-resisted audit trails 
by leveraging the blockchain technology. We also provide a theoretical support of 
data exchange in the confidentiality and accountability. In the reminder of this paper, 
Section II reviews related work and section III formulates our problem. Section IV 
proposes our approach and implementation is discussed in section V. Section VI con-
cludes our paper. 
2 Related Work 
Research in blockchain is covered in diverse domains most notably aspects of tracea-
bility and immutability, such as auditing workflow in government processes [10], 
enterprise business [11], and healthcare data exchange [12][13]. For government ap-
plications, permissionless blockchain is not considered to be suitable for government 
audit systems due to the difficulty of verifying user identities and enforcing strict data 
governance [10]. 
Some prior work give a literature review of blockchain technology in auditing en-
vironment [14][10], which provided a theoretical support without empirical practice. 
Blockchain technology provides a solution to automate mechanism for trust without 
intermediary [10], such as any central authorities. It can also be used to minimize 
fraud, optimize the existing procedures, and reduce workloads of auditors [14]. How-
ever, those papers have not mentioned more details on how to integrate the block-
chain technology with the existing auditing processes. 
In the prototype design, many previous researches have involved in the proof of 
concepts development with blockchain. To audit transactions in the data exchange 
workflow, Ahmad et al. propose a system that records distributed and immutable logs 
in the Hyperledger blockchain against the external and internal attacks [11]. The 
transparent logs are stored in the public blockchain without access restrictions. There-
fore, this system is not suitable for credential authorities or institutions that require 
secrecy. Pourmajidi et al. [15] propose an approach based on the super-blockchain 
and circled blockchain to record and receive logs. Individuals can access logs through 
some APIs to the immutable hierarchical ledger. The key issue is that this scheme 
may increase the time to retrieve logs because of the multiple-hierarchical structure of 
blocks storage. An evaluation is required to verify the impact their proposal on per-
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formance. Suzuki et al. design a prototype system based upon the test environment of 
Bitcoin [16], which is to use blockchain to construct audit logs for strictly access con-
trolled in client-server communication channel. It cannot solve the high-energy con-
sumption as well as the latency in system implementation caused by the mining pro-
cess, although there is compensated through coin returns. 
3 Problem Statement 
This section formulates the problems that we tackle, presents a threat model, and lists 
the designed goals. 
3.1 Problem Definition  
To illustrate, we use a linear topology - see Fig. 2. Nodes (A, B - E) represent the 
involved organisations or individuals that they are objects to transmit data. The arrow 
represents the direction of data flow. The processes of data flow and the related enti-
ties are pre-established, which means the interaction between workflow participants 
are pre-defined. When A is the information sender, who wants to send information to 
B. A knows the receiver is B and B knows the sender is A. If an outside attacker 
plants a forged data instead of the payload that B sent to C, we need to ensure that the 
honest node C can detect this action. If B colludes with D that they tamper with the 
existing audit information and repudiate performed actions to avoid incrimination 
during inspection, there should be enough evidence to make other honest nodes spot 
the incorrect data. If a confidential data is exfiltrated, it is necessary to ensure that the 
data is encrypted and exposed minimal information.This paper focuses on the level of 
security improvement in aspects of the accountability of data exchange and transac-
tions reflecting performed actions of the involved participants. We propose a block-
chain-based smart auditable check scheme to solve problems that mentioned above. 
3.2 Threats Model and Assumptions 
In this section, we present out threat model and security assumptions. The audit server 
includes codes of a smart-contract run on the blockchain that is trusted to perform the 
protocol, which stores audit records and conducts the verification triggered by the 
workflow participants. The workflow participants are trusted but some of them may 
collude with others to intentionally deny their mischievous actions or modify the ex-
isting information in the storage after the fact. The outside attackers can eavesdrop on 
message from the transmission channel and plant forged message instead of the true 
one in the workflow. Any of participants in the workflow can collude with others to 
repudiate the performed actions. Therefore, we propose a scheme that is based upon 
assumptions as below: 
Assumption 1: the blockchain is deemed as trusted to immutable store data. 
Assumption 2: the workflow participants do not intentionally expose their private 
keys. 
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Assumption 3: there is at least one honest participant in every workflow. 
3.3 Designed Goals 
We design our proposed scheme to satisfy the following goals: 
 Confidentiality and integrity. All workflow participants cannot forge or tamper the 
existing information after-the-fact. Only the data owner can generate correct en-
crypted audit logs. The nodes of blockchain and workflow cannot forge or tamper 
the audit logs even if they are dishonest individuals or collude with others.  Be-
sides, the audit logs are only stored and verified in cipher form. They cannot be 
exposed intentionally in a plaintext form. In other words, they cannot be viewed or 
modified in an undetected or unauthorized way. What’s more, the audit server is 
only store the related encrypted audit logs and keys. 
 Availability. Participants cannot escape the audit processes when they require a 
service. All encrypted audit logs are tamper-resistant and stored in the blockchain. 
The honest node can access the audit trail to verify the received data. 
The above security aspects help to achieve accountability assurance that enabled by 
having reliable evidence. Our security model renders our approach suitable for appli-
cations in which the confidentiality of digital evidence is a requirement. We also aim 
to assure the availability and integrity of audit trails. 
4 Proposed Approach 
Our proposed scheme relies on public key cryptography (PKI), a group of signatures, 
records verification, and Shamir secret sharing scheme. PKI is used to encrypt ex-
changed messages which improves the confidentiality of workflow. Shamir secret 
scheme has a positive impact on the protection of encrypted data (in our case is the 
audit trail). It is theoretically not feasible to decrypt the audit records with one split of 
the key [17]. The usage of a group of signatures is to mark each action that ensures 
the data integrity. Audit records verification is an important component, which ena-
bles participants to check the correctness of audit records equivalent to a transaction 
that was received. In this section, we introduce the description of notation, system 
architecture, the related protocol, and key management. 
4.1 Notation 
For easier of description and reference, symbols used in the proposed scheme are 
summarized as below. The keyGen is an abbreviation of key generation. 
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Table 1. A table of notation description 
 
4.2 System Architecture 
We show a view of the system architecture of our proposed scheme (see Fig. 3), 
which includes three main components: nodes, audit server, and certificate authority. 
 Nodes. They are participants involved in the workflow, such as authorities, stake-
holders, and so on. In this paper, each node represents one of entities that collabo-
rates and exchanges information in a workflow. 
 Audit server. We run the audit server in the Ethereum blockchain. All audit trails 
are encrypted and then stored in the blockchain that can be accessed by nodes.  
 Certificate authority (CA). It is a trusted authority to generate keys for diverse 
workflows. This can be a professional authority that depends on the workflow. 
 
Fig. 3. The system architecture of the proposed scheme 
4.3 Key Management 
We assume that all entities have a unique identification and it can be used in the dif-
ferent workflows. Each workflow has a specified single pair of keys that can be only 
used in this workflow. 
 Identity key management. To identify all relevant participants, all of them have 
their unique pair of keys when they register in the blockchain. Every public key is 
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stored in the blockchain. Participants save their private keys as identities and use 
them to approve transaction in the workflow. 
 Workflow key management. A CA provides a unique single pair of keys for every 
workflow. The private key of the workflow is divided into pieces of partial keys 
based upon the cryptographic algorithm of Shamir’s secret sharing [17]. The 
amount of Shamir threshold keys depends on numbers of participants in the work-
flow. Every participant has its own part of WSK for each workflow. At the same 
time, the CA stores all workflow public keys to the blockchain. 
4.4 Protocol 
We show a protocol to implement our auditable check scheme in this section. It is 
composed of three phases, which are system initialization, data exchange, and records 
verification. Fig. 4 shows a part of sequence diagram of the proposed protocol. 
 
Fig. 4. A sequence diagram of our scheme. The initial phase (step 1-5) is key generation and 
distribution. Phase 2 (step 6-10) is data processes between participant and blockchain. Phase 3 
(step 11-13) is records verification. 
Phase 1: System Initialization. It aims to initialize keys of the participants and work-
flow. All participants have a cryptographic key pair (PKN and SKN) as their identities. 
A CA provides a single pair of keys for each workflow (WK and WSK). Each node has 
a public key (WK) and a split of the private key (Kn) of each workflow. In the Fig. 4, 
A has PKA, SKA, WK, and K1. The blockchain stores keys of PKA and WK. 
Phase 2: Data Exchange. In this phase, the message sender signs and encrypts the 
predefined message to ensure the security of transmission. When A wants to send 
message to B, the initial payload is MAB. First, A needs to sign MAB and then encrypt 
it with key PKB of B. The payload is represented by 
 PayloadAB = EncryptB [SignA (MAB) + MAB] = (SA, EB) (1) 
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Then, A signs the encrypted payload again to mark the previous performed action 
before the payload transmission. The payload is expressed by 
 PayloadAB = Sign’A (PayloadAB) + PayloadAB = (S’A, SA, EB) (2) 
During the date exchange, a system log is generated to record the exchanged data. 
Each node stores their system logs in the local storage. The hash values of these sys-
tem logs (namely, audit log) are published timely to the audit server as the immutable 
blocks. A system log includes an encrypted message with a key WK and a group of 
signatures. The second signature is to verify that encrypted logs have not been tam-
pered with without having to decrypt the logs. When an audit log is saved in the 
blockchain, the message sender receives a receipt from the scheme. In the Fig. 4, 
SysLogAB is the system log that records the data exchange between A and B. 
AudLogAB is the published audit log to the blockchain for the audit trail. They are 
represented respectively by 
 SysLogAB = Sign’A [EncryptWK (SignA, MAB)] + EncryptWK (SignA, MAB) (3) 
 AudLogAB = [S’A, Hash (SA, EWK)] (4) 
Phase 3: Records Verification. This phase is to verify all performed actions of data 
flow from workflow participants. The participant always checks whether the hash 
value of encrypted payload (Payload’NM) is matched with audit log (AudLogNM). 
When the recipient received the payload (PayloadNM) from the sender, the cipher 
message (MNM) is decrypted with a private key (SKN) of the recipient. Before the 
match, MNM is encrypted again with a workflow public key (WK) by the recipient and 
conducted as a new payload (Payload’NM). Then, it is the comparison of the hash val-
ue of Payload’NM and AudLogNM in a smart-contract. If the result of match is false, the 
workflow is stopped. Considering the integrity of data in the flow, the recipient needs 
to give a feedback (NoticeNM) to the sender when the payload is transferred. For ex-
ample, when B receives payload from A successfully, a notice is sent to A. 
Then, B gets the MAB from the payload through the decryption of the PayloadAB 
with key SKB. In the match, B encrypts MAB with key WK and calculates a hash value 
of it. The new payload is represented by 
 Payload’AB = [S’A, SA, Hash (EWK)] (5) 
5 Performance Evaluation 
We implement our scheme in the Ethereum blockchain, with the blockchain as the 
audit server that is conducted in a smart-contract for the data verification and audit 
log storage. We design a simple user interface as the interaction client for the work-
flow participant, which is to report and download audit log, and trigger with the 




The implementation of our scheme is mainly to build codes of smart-contracts. Fig.5 
shows a representative smart-contract code. There are two smart-contracts to enable 
the records verification and audit logs reporting. First contract ‘AuditLog’ constructs 
a function ‘generateLog’ to save audit trail into the blockchain as the immutable stor-
age. Second contract ‘Verification’ is an inheritance contract of the first one, it is 
developed to access audit trail from the blockchain and verify the records. The func-
tion ‘getLog’ is to get audit trail by the specified address, notably, the account address 
of audit log reporter. The function ‘compareLogs’ is to compare hash values of audit 
trail and payload. This function is required to only operate by the current account of 
participant. ‘ownerOf’ function is a modifier to implement the operation control for 
function ‘compareLogs’. When a node performs the data transmission in the work-
flow, a new contract will be created to save audit log into the blockchain. Once a node 
receives a payload from the previous node, the node can verify the payload through 
the smart-contract. 
 
Fig. 5. The central smart-contract. One contract is to generate a new block to save the audit log 
with function ‘generateLog’. The second one is an inheritance of the first one that verifies the 
data from audit log and payload, which consists of function ‘getLog’ and ‘compareLogs’. 
5.2 Security Analysis 
We discuss the security requirements for the proposed scheme in malicious operations 
as below. It includes malicious participant and collusion attacks. 
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Malicious Participant. In a workflow, a dishonest entity can eavesdrop data from the 
transmission channel, disrupt the data flow, or plant a forged message into the flow. 
However, the honest entity can detect these attacks with the audit record verification 
mechanism in the proposed scheme. We discuss internal and external aspects of mali-
cious attacks. For the internal attacks, if an internal node tries to withhold a payload to 
interrupt the data exchange, the next node cannot receive the related payload. There-
fore, this malicious attempt is detected on the fly. If the internal node uses the fraudu-
lent data instead of the original payload, it can be detected in the records verification. 
There is an error when the hash value of the fake payload matches with the original 
one in the audit log. If the node tampers with or removes a local audit record, records 
on the audit server will reveal the malicious activities because of the immutability of 
blockchain. As for the external attacks, based on the assumption 2 and without the 
knowledge of participants’ private keys, the external node cannot plant a forged mes-
sage to pass the verification. The honest node can detect the attempt. In addition, the 
message are exchanged in encrypted form, it makes eavesdropping on the data flow 
useless to external attacks.   
Collusion Attacks. When two or more than two nodes collude with each other in the 
data flow, their fraudulent actions can be exposed by the honest node (assumption 3). 
For instance, we assume that B colludes with C in Fig. 3. When D receives the forged 
payload (PayloadCD) from C, the hash value comparison between PayloadCD with 
AudLogCD is triggered by D. If there is not match in the comparison, C is suspected of 
that malicious behavior. What’s more, even if C repudiates it and ask B to frame A, 
we can verify AudLogAB and PayloadAB to against it. If B colludes with D, they plant 
forged payloads (PayloadBC, PayloadDA) and deny their performed actions. For this 
case, the honest node can also detect it. C and A can verify payloads separately when 
they receive payload. As seen, our proposed protocol mitigates the impact of collu-
sion attacks as possible. 
6 Conclusion 
In this paper, we discussed the usage of the Ethereum blockchain to enable auditing of 
workflow transactions. We provided a blockchain-based smart auditable check 
scheme that constructs a complete immutable audit trail for every action of partici-
pants in data transmission. Our audit scheme satisfies our aim to enable confidentiali-
ty, integrity, and accountability for a generic topology of data flow. As for future 
work, we will test the scheme in the real Ethereum network. The latency of new block 
generated is a consideration that affects the data flow efficiency. Besides, the genera-
tion of key pair for each workflow is also concern due to human factors from the cer-
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